Using multilevel modeling of state-level economic data and individual-level exit poll data from the 2000 Mexican presidential election, we find that income has a stronger effect in predicting the vote for the conservative party in poorer states than in richer states-a pattern that has also been found in recent U.S. elections. In addition (and unlike in the U.S.), richer states on average tend to support the conservative party at higher rates than poorer states. Our findings are consistent with the 2006 Mexican election, which showed a profound divide between rich and poor states. Income is an important predictor of the vote both at the individual and the state levels.
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On the left of the political spectrum, we find the PRD, the party of the "clase popular" (i.e., the poor); on the right is the PAN, the party of the middle class; and in a blurry center is the PRI, the former ruling party. At the individual level, public opinion and exit poll data show that voters of higher income and socioeconomic status tend to support the PAN while the less affluent tend to support the PRD or the PRI (Moreno 2003 , Klesner 2004 , Reforma 2006 . At the regional level, Figure 1 shows that the PAN regularly has done better in the wealthier parts of the country (center-west and north), and worse in Mexico City and the south (Klesner 2004, p. 105) . 6 At this level of aggregation, however, the relationship between income and vote choice is not so clear. For instance, the average GDP per capita 7 in the regions won by the PAN in 2000 was $9,050, while the GDP per capita in those regions where the PAN under-performed was $8,800 (PNUD 2003) .
At the state level, a different picture emerges. The average GDP per capita in the states won by the PAN was $10,200 for 2000 and $9,700 in 2006. In contrast, the GDP per capita in those 6 Adapting Klesner (2004), we define the regions as: north: Baja California, Baja California Sur, Coahuila, Chihuahua, Durango, Nuevo Leon, San Luis Ptosi, Sinaloa, Sonora, Tamaulipas, Zacatecas; center-west: Aguascalientes, Colima, Guanajuato, Jalisco, Michoacan, Nayarit, Queretaro; center : Estado de Mexico, Hidalgo, Morelos, Puebla, Tlaxcala; south: Campeche, Chiapas, Guerrero, Oaxaca, Quintana Roo, Tabasco, Veracruz, Yucatan. For our analyses, we consider the Federal District (Mexico, D.F.) as a separate state from the rest of the Estado de Mexico.
7 GDP in 2000 PPP U.S. dollars.
5
states won by the PRD was $4,800 in 2000 and $7,300 for 2006. 8 Figure 2 shows the details, and the variation within each plot reveals that collapsing multiple states into large regions entails significant loss of information that otherwise may uncover sharper and quite revealing differences between states.
Overall, PAN does better in the richer states and the PRD does better in the poorer states.
However, Figure 2 also shows that there are no definite or absolute regional partisan strongholds.
In other words, there is more variation between states than is suggested by current literature. One way to account for this variation between states, going beyond the inclusion of indicator variables for each state, is to use multilevel modeling. This statistical technique allows us to understand the relation between income and vote among individuals and states simultaneously.
Methods
Multilevel modeling allows us to estimate patterns of variation within and between groups (in this case, states), taking into account the hierarchical nature of the data (individuals within states) and also the specific characteristics of each state by allowing their intercepts and slopes to vary. (See, e.g., Snijders & Bosker (1999) for a general overview of multilevel models, and Gelman et al. (2005) for the particular example of income and voting.)
Our central model is a varying-intercept, varying-slope model predicting vote choice from individual income and GDP per capita, which we fit to data from the Grupo Reforma 2000 national exit poll (Reforma, El Norte & Mural 2000) excluding those respondents who did not report for whom they voted or who supported parties other than the PAN, PRI, or PRD. This left us with 2,540 responses, with sample sizes within states ranging from 9 in Tlaxcala to 339 in Estado de
Mexico. The multilevel model allows us to estimate the income-voting relation in each state, with the estimates for the larger states coming largely from their own data and the estimates for smaller states relying more of the state-level regression model. 9
The model for individual voters i is
where y i represents vote choice (1 = PRD, 2 = PRI, 3 = PAN), and x i represents household income on a standardized scale. 10 The continuous model is clearly an approximation on this discrete scale, and so, as discussed below, we also fit logistic regressions to predict the vote for the parties of the right and the left. 11
Since we are interested in comparing states with different wealth, we include GDP per capita within each state as a state-level predictor. The group-level intercepts and slopes are modeled as,
where u j is the GDP per capita in state j, and the errors α j , α j have mean 0, variances σ 2 α , σ 2 β , and correlation ρ, all of which are estimated from the data when combined with the individual model.
We also let the general levels for the intercepts and slopes (the parameters γ α 0 and γ β 0 ) vary by region (north, center-west, center, south, and Mexico City), so that the model allows systematic variation by region and among states within regions.
In addition, we examine the estimated intercepts α j and slopes β j when including other predictors: state inequality, sex, age categories, the type of locality (urban, mixed or rural), the main reason for voting they voted (for a change, for the candidate, civic duty, custom, the least of evils, party loyalty, campaign promises, or other reasons), 12 and religion (Roman Catholic, evangelical Christian, other).
Our next step is to analyze each party by itself, modeling the probability of supporting the PAN and the PRD candidate, controlling for individual income and state GDP per capita. We fit a multilevel varying-intercept, varying-slope logistic regression of the form
adapting model (1) to the logistic scale. The state intercepts and slopes are modeled as in (2). We fit two different logistic regressions: PAN versus all others, and PRD versus all others.
For the linear model (1), positive slopes β j correspond to richer voters within states supporting the PAN. For the logistic models (3), we would expect positive slopes β j for the PAN model 10 The survey had nine income categories (in pesos per month): $0-$1,000, $1,001-$2,000, $2,001-$4,000, $4,001-$6,000, $6, 001-$8,000, $8,001-$12,000, $12,001-$16,000, $16,001-$20,000 , and more than $20,000. We coded these as 1-9 and then standardized by subtracting the mean and dividing by two standard deviations (Gelman 2006) .
11 We are also exploring multinomial logit and probit models, which involve some technical challenges since we are fitting these models in a multilevel context. We do not expect the multinomial discrete models to change the substantive findings.
12 We include the reason for voting because of its relevance in determining vote choice, as mentioned in Section 1.
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(corresponding to richer voters being more likely to support the PAN candidate) and negative slopes for the PRD model. We summarize the models by plotting the curves α j + β j x (for the linear model) and logit −1 (α j + β j x) (for the logistic models) for each of the 32 states, and by plotting the estimated intercepts α j and estimated slopes β j vs. u j , the state-level GDP per capita.
We fit the models using Bugs (Spiegelhalter, Thomas, Best & Lunn 2003 , Sturtz, Ligges & Gelman 2005 ) and the lmer function in R (R Development Core Team 2006 , Bates 2005 , following the approach of Gelman et al. (2005) .
Results
Individuals within states
We first present the results of fitting the linear model (1) predicting vote choice (on a 1-3 scale)
given individual income. Our next step is to add state inequality, gender, age, type of locality, the main reason for which voters say they voted, and religion. The coefficients for individual and state-level income show similar patterns as before, so for the remaining analyses we only use income and GDP per capita as predictors, since we are interested in studying the differences between the affluent and less affluent voters. Even if the effects of income and GDP per capita had been explained by other predictors, the correlations would still be real, in the sense of representing real differences between rich and poor voters, and rich and poor states. Now, to ascertain if income matters more in poor states than in rich states just as in the U.S.,
we plot the estimated state intercepts and slopes as a function of the average state GDP per capita.
To explore these results further, we display in Figure 4 the intercept α j and the slope β j for the 32 states including Mexico City, 13 plotted vs. state income. On average, richer states have higher intercepts and lower slopes than poor states (with the pattern especially clear outside of Mexico City, which is a clear outlier as the richest state, with voting patterns more typical of poorer areas). Figure 3 . The curves show lowess fits (Cleveland 1979) . Intercepts tend to be higher and slopes tend to be lower in the richer states. When the model is fitted excluding D.F., the positive correlation between intercepts and per-capita GDP in the 31 states, and the negative correlation between slopes and per-capita GDP, are even stronger.
The higher intercepts (as shown in Figure 4a ) tell us that a voter of average income is more likely to support the conservative candidate if he or she lives in a richer state. Thus, the differences between rich and poor states are not simply aggregates of differences in individual incomes. Figure 4b shows that, similarly to the U.S. (see Figure 13 in Gelman et al. (2005) ), income matters more in poorer states than in richer states. Poor voters in poorer states are expected to vote at higher rates for the PRD and PRI (the parties on the left) than poor voters in richer states.
This can be seen in Figure 3 , where, proportionally, more of the poor voters support the PRD and PRI in Chiapas, Oaxaca, Zacatecas, Guerrero, and Tlaxcala, than in Chihuahua, Quintana Roo, Campeche, Nuevo Leon, and Mexico City.
PAN or PRD?
Considering all three major parties, we have found a positive correlation between income and conservative voting. Moreover, this relationship is, on average, stronger in poorer states than in richer states. We now consider the logistic regressions, first considering the rightmost major party (PAN) compared to all others, then the leftmost (PRD) compared to all others. Figure 5 shows the estimated slopes for the 32 states, plotted vs. GDP per capita, for each of the two logistic regressions. Once again, we see that income matters more in poorer states than in richer states, with quite a bit of variation between states in the role of income in predicting the vote.
The slopes are positive in Figure 5a and negative in Figure 5b , which makes sense given the opposite orientations of the PAN and PRD. In addition, the absolute levels of the slope are much higher for the PAN model (compare the vertical axes of the two graphs in Figure 5 ), indicating that income is a stronger predictor of PAN vote than PRD vote. This is a subtlety of the multiparty system, in which the three major parties are not aligned on a single dimension.
Discussion
We have found the following patterns:
1. Rich states tend to support the conservative party (the PAN) at higher rates than poor states, an opposite pattern from that found in the United States. There are no definite or absolute regional partisan strongholds; that is, there is more variation between states and within regions than what current literature may suggest. 11 2. In all states, the PAN does better among higher-income voters, but poor voters in richer states tend to support the PAN at higher rates than poor voters in poorer states. That is, income is less important as a predictor in rich states than in poor states.
How can we understand these patterns at the individual and state levels? One plausible explanation has to do with each state's social structure. Those states with more conservative structures are going to be those that, on average, tend to support the PAN at higher rates than those states with less conservative social structures. For instance, historically the PAN has had a close identification with the Catholic church and with its social Christian message. The PAN has done better in those municipios 14 with a higher percentage of Catholics than in those municipios with lower concentrations of Catholics (Moreno 2003) .
In a similar vein, in terms of GDP per capita, poorer states on average tend to be more rural and slightly more conservative than richer states. Individuals in poorer states, especially the wealthy, may be more conservative on average than those wealthy individuals in rich states who may be less conservative and more cosmopolitan; hence, the PAN electoral platform may be more appealing for rich voters living in poorer states than for rich voters living in richer states.
Overall, our analysis indicates that richer states tend to support the PAN candidate at higher rates than poorer states. However, by applying multilevel modeling techniques we were able to show that there is much more variation between states than when they are collapsed in large regions.
Moreover, while income is positively related with the PAN vote (as previous analyses have shown), its impact seems to be stronger within poorer states than within medium and richer states.
